
Power to the People--
Positive Alternatives to the Oregon Health
Plan
October 1994
By Peter J. Ferrara
The initial implementation of the Oregon Health Plan started February 1 this year. Since then, experience under the plan has reinforced the key objections raised against it over the last few years.
The plan sets the state's health care system on a course that will sharply reduce freedom of choice and control by individual patients and consumers over their own health care.
The plan will increase rather than reduce costs.
This report advances an alternative reform proposal that will maintain freedom of choice and control by patients and consumers over their own health and its care. But first the report will analyze the current Oregon Health Plan in more detail.
The goal of the Oregon Health Plan is to achieve universal coverage throughout the state. The first step under the plan is to expand Medicaid assistance to everyone below the poverty line. However, the plan is partly financed with a complex, bureaucratic, central planning, government rationing scheme under which the government -- rather than the patients and their chosen doctors -- decides which services and treatments patients should receive. As will be discussed further below, this rationing scheme cannot be operated effectively as a practical matter and, as a matter of ethical principle, it unacceptably restricts the freedom of individuals to control the health related transactions they want, need and prefer.
The next step in the plan, slated to become effective in 1997 and 1998, is an employer mandate requiring all employers in the state to pay 75 percent of the cost of health coverage for their workers. As a matter of accepted standard economic analysis, the costs of this mandate will ultimately be born by workers, rather than employers, through lower wages and/or lower employment. In the process, the mandate would cause an unnecessary loss of jobs for some workers. Moreover, as discussed further below, this mandate will not work to achieve universal coverage. Alternative measures not involving the mandate's unnecessary costs can more effectively lead to universal coverage.
Finally, the Oregon Health Plan will not only fail to reduce costs, but will increase them instead. The state now estimates that the plan will cost $708 million in state funds over the 1995 - 1997 biennium, almost twice the estimated Medicaid cost over the 1993 - 1995 biennium without the Oregon Health Plan reforms, which was $388.5 million. With federal funds, the total cost of the Oregon Health Plan over the 1995 - 1997 budget cycle would be $1.9 billion, again almost double the total estimated 1993 - 1995 Medicaid cost without the reforms, which was just over $1 billion. Moreover, as discussed further below, these cost-increasing incentives in the Oregon Health Plan are just beginning to take effect.(1)
The Oregon Health Plan includes some highly desirable goals. It seeks to end the drastic underpayment of doctors and hospitals typical of Medicaid across the country, which boils down to imposing back-door rationing on the poor and a hidden tax on the middle class through cost-shifting. Universal coverage and cost control are also highly desirable goals. But these goals need to be achieved through means that are not only effective but that maintain freedom of choice and control by patients and consumers over their own health care.
In February, the Oregon Health Plan extended Medicaid coverage to all individuals below the poverty line, except the elderly, disabled, blind, and foster children, who remain covered under the old Medicaid program. Coverage was also extended to pregnant women and children under 6 with family incomes below 133 percent of the federal poverty level.
On January 1, 1995, the remaining individuals still in the old Medicaid program would be moved into the new Oregon Health Plan. Mental health services and drug and alcohol abuse rehabilitation would also be added to the covered benefits. Overall, the Oregon Health Plan is projected to add about 120,000 people to the 180,000 covered under the old Medicaid program. Medicaid coverage under the new health plan is projected to climb to 345,000 in 1995, 375,000 in 1996, and 407,000 in 1997. Individuals in the Oregon Health Plan are given a benefit package specified by the government. To develop that package, the Oregon Health Services Commission ranked all relevant medical services on a list of 696 categories, through a process described in more detail below. The legislature then determined that it had sufficient funds to finance coverage for the first 565 of those services, excluding coverage for services in categories below 565 on the list.
Among the health services that the Oregon Health Services Commission (established in 1989 specifically for the purpose of developing and administering such a rationing plan) decided should be excluded from coverage are treatments for liver cancer, cancers that have become widely spread, viral pneumonia, chronic bronchitis, acute viral hepatitis, slipped discs and other back disorders, aseptic meningitis, phlebitis, pleurisy, perinatal digestive disorders, kidney cysts, uncomplicated gallstones, traumatic brain injury, and progressive dementia. Also excluded are much, if not most of routine medical care such as treatment for non-fatal viral infections, upper respiratory infections, colds, minor burns, laryngitis, mononucleosis and others. These sicknesses are expected to go away on their own.
In future years, the legislature would determine how far down the list its available funds can go in financing coverage under the Oregon Health Plan. If funding becomes insufficient, then coverage for the lowest categories on this list would be further eliminated until spending is again equal to the available funds. Another option might include restricting eligibility to the plan.
In general, those covered under the Oregon Health Plan receive their services through a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) or similar managed care arrangement. The state pays the HMO a flat monthly or "capitation fee" for each covered individual, in return for the HMO proving the funded services on the above-described list. The excluded services, and their costs, are not covered.
These reforms would still leave about 300,000 uninsured people in the state who earn too much to qualify for Medicaid assistance. The Oregon Health Plan expects to cover almost all of these people through both an employer and individual mandate. For firms with 26 or more workers, the mandates go into effect on March 31, 1997. For firms with less than 26 workers, the mandates go into effect on January 1, 1998.
Under the mandates, employers must pay for 75 percent of the cost of coverage for their workers, and 50 percent of the cost for the worker's dependents. The workers are required to pay the rest. Employers can choose to pay into a new state Insurance Pool Fund, which would provide coverage for the same plan as for Medicaid described above. Presumably, workers would have to make their payments to the state pool and receive coverage from the pool when employers make that choice.
Before the employer mandate can go into effect, Congress must enact an exemption under the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). If that exemption is not granted by January 2, 1996, then the mandates will be automatically repealed under state law. Some legislators plan to propose a repeal of the mandate in the next session in any event.
The Legislature also created the Health Resources Commission, which is to develop a process for deciding on the allocation of medical technologies in Oregon. In 1989, the Legislature created the Oregon Medical Insurance Pool which provides coverage to those who are otherwise uninsurable because of pre-existing medical conditions. This pool is discussed further below.
The Legislature has also adopted regulations intended to enable small businesses to purchase health coverage more easily.
The state's attempt to prioritize all health services on a single list as the basis for the services covered under the Oregon Health Plan was an intellectually misbegotten venture from the start. The list supposedly ranks health services by clinical effectiveness, cost, and value to society. But advocates of this effort and those involved in it failed to fully appreciate the following inherent, intractable difficulties in such an enterprise.
The Oregon Health Services Commission primarily obtained its information concerning clinical effectiveness by distributing survey forms to health professionals, asking for on-the-spot estimates of the effectiveness of different medical services. To put it baldly, and it must be put baldly given the importance of the resulting policies, this methodology is scientifically ridiculous. It does not produce anywhere near the rigorous, thorough, scientifically tested information that would be necessary to claim that the health services were truly ranked based on clinical effectiveness.
Moreover, gaining sufficiently rigorous information to scientifically prioritize all health services by clinical effectiveness is an inherently overwhelming, indeed impossible task. The entire range of the medical literature contains reliable, scientific studies on only a relatively small number of services. Conducting such studies for all medical services could not even be completed before at least some of the studies had become outdated because of changes in the population, technology and society. We could say that such studies are generally outdated before the results could be effectively utilized.
As Joshua Wiener of the Brookings Institution, who is sympathetic to the Oregon Health Plan, has written:
For most condition-treatment pairs, there are no empirical data on which to base the judgments of their likely effectiveness. The calculations of clinical effectiveness are guesstimates by Oregon officials.(2)
In addition, there is another problem. The clinical effectiveness of different medical services varies considerably from patient to patient (depending on age, medical history, etc.), from doctor to doctor (depending on skill and other factors), and from place to place (depending on facilities available). But the Oregon Health Services Commission has absolutely no methodology to take this variation into account.
The vague, subjective, and often ill-considered statements that can be obtained through these methods can hardly be counted as a thorough and rigorous expression of the values and preferences of all the people in Oregon. Moreover, these values and preferences naturally vary considerably from individual to individual, and vary over time for each individual as circumstances change. The Commission has no way of taking these differences into account. In addition, public hearings and community meetings tend to be dominated by organized special interests and, therefore, reflect their views rather than the views of the general public. Politics tends to desplace science.
Addition, the Commission has no methodology for translating the stated values and preferences obtained from the public into a ranking of all medical services. In the end, the Commissioners themselves simply filtered, categorized and adjusted the rankings of the services based on their judgment regarding the public's values and preferences. The rankings could consequently be said to reflect the values and preferences of the Commission members rather than the people of the state.
Ranking all medical services by clinical effectiveness or value to society inherently involves judgments about the quality or value of life among the different people in society. Is a medical service which saves the lives of older people as effective or valuable as one which saves the lives of children? Is a service which improves a condition but does not completely cure it as effective or valuable as a different service for others that completely restores their health? Is the alleviation of some conditions, some symptoms, or some suffering more important and, therefore, more effective, or more valuable than for other conditions, symptoms, or suffering?
These issues involve not just uncollectible data, but unanswerable questions. Such cosmic, philosophical concerns have no definitive, universally applicable answers. They involve judgments that individuals and families can make only for themselves, but not for others. Indeed, they would have no basis for doing so. Here, politics displaces individual choice.
Even the cost of medical services data available to the Commission was wholly inadequate. The Commission largely obtained this data again through surveys of doctors and other health professionals. This did not produce the thorough, reliable, comprehensive, rigorous results necessary to conduct a true ranking based on cost or cost-effectiveness. Moreover, the Commission cannot demonstrate that its final ranking reflects costs of different medical services in any consistent or principled manner.
A Wall Street Journal article highlighting the Harvard report further discredits the ranking methodology: "Oregon's ranking of Medicaid services -- touted as a possible national model for setting medical priorities -- falls far short of maximizing cost-effectiveness... The Harvard team's analysis of Oregon's Medicaid rankings underscores how politics can skew cost-effectiveness." Cost-effectiveness was abandoned because it "...didn't follow the general intuition of where things should be." In short, politics got in the way.(3)
The Commission ran into another intractable barrier in trying to develop its list - the federal Americans With Disability Act (ADA). The public has not recognized the degree to which the ADA negated the Commission's effort to develop its ranking of medical services.
Under the ADA, the Federal government insisted that the Commission could not consider quality of life in its ranking because that concept would inherently involve a judgment on the quality of life of the disabled, chronically ill, or those suffering from other symptoms. The Federal government prohibited any consideration of the severity of symptoms because this would inherently disadvantage the disabled or chronically ill who would continue to suffer from more severe symptoms regardless of medical service. It prohibited any consideration of whether a condition was acute or chronic, that is continuing even after medical treatment if chronic, or completely or at least mostly resolvable by medical treatment if acute. It prohibited any consideration of whether medical services were completely effective in eliminating symptoms and fully restoring health, because, again, the disabled or the chronically ill could not be completely cured of all symptoms. Finally, it basically prohibited the use of public values, preferences from the telephone survey and all other public input because it found that these preferences were inevitably based on the above impermissible considerations.
As a result, the Commission ranking of health services was reduced to the following methodology:
1) The medical services were ranked first on the ability of each service to prevent death.
2) The services that were tied were then ranked on the average cost of the treatment.
3) Those services that were still tied were then ranked alphabetically.
4) The Commissioners then readjusted the list according to their judgment.
Services that did not involve prevention of death were consequently ranked solely on the basis of their average cost, alphabetical ordering, and Commissioner readjustment.(4)
Finally, after all the sound and fury, the list of medical services has hardly had any significant cost saving effect. The state estimates that the list will save about $35 million per year in health costs.(5) Yet, over the next biennium, the Oregon Health Plan will cost almost $1 billion per year in Medicaid assistance. That is, the rationing involved in the list only reduces costs by 3 to 4 percent at most. After considering administrative costs, the net savings is probably significantly less. And the state may well overestimate the effect of its efforts.
In short, the medical services priority list is an anti-market, central planning exercise. As a result, as with other central planning efforts, it will be inherently unworkable because of the impossibility of collecting sufficient data, accurately reflecting true public values, taking into account differences among individuals and changes over time, and ultimately to answer the unknowable. These are the same problems that have brought down all other non-market, central planning efforts in all fields around the world.
As the best economists have long recognized, the Commission goals can only be accomplished through a decentralized free market. In a sound health care market, each individual would make health care decisions for him or herself based on their own values, preferences and judgments about quality of life. There would be no need, therefore, to collect uncollectible data, aggregate subjective preferences that cannot be aggregated, and answer the cosmically unanswerable. Moreover, medical services would prosper in the market to the extent they were effective in return for the costs, as judged by each patient for himself, with the advice of doctors and other medical professionals. In a true market, moreover, cost data would be automatically reflected in prices far more effectively than could ever be possibly achieved by cost studies. The reforms discussed later in this report would produce an adequately operational market performing these functions.
Another set of problems with the medical services priority list is that it involves the government in making decisions that as a matter of ethical principle can only be made by individuals for themselves. In a free society, the government must not get involved in choosing among medical services in place of its citizens. The government should not be deciding what care patients can receive and when, who should suffer and for how long, and who should live and who should die. The government can do so only on the basis of arbitrary discrimination among its citizens and has no objective basis for making these decisions. As Oregon state Rep. Tom Mason (D-Portland) has said,
"That is what the Oregon plan does throughout: It values one person's life over another for subjective reasons, the ultimate act of discrimination.(6)
Such health care decisions can only be made ethically by the individual patients and their families themselves, under a system in which they have the right incentives to weigh costs against benefits and decide what care they prefer. Indeed, the federal ADA seems to effectively embody these ethical views as a matter of federal anti-discrimination law, given the federal interpretation of the ADA discussed above.
When the government usurps these health care decisions with rationing dictates, it usurps the essential freedom of the people to control one of the most fundamental and intimate aspects of their lives - their own health and its care. A free society must maintain the freedom of the people to control their own health and care.
It may be objected that with the medical services priority list Oregon is only deciding which services it will subsidize and which it won't. But this system still goes too far in usurping the autonomy and freedom of individuals, involving the government in decisions it cannot make on a ethical or even informed basis. The government can validly limit its subsidies by deciding how much it will provide and then allowing the recipients to make their own choices among health services with those funds.
The problem can perhaps be seen more easily by examining some of the statements made on behalf of the medical services priority list. The state Department of Human Resources says that the benefit package based on the list priorities excludes coverage for "conditions for which treatment is generally ineffective."(7) But surely we do not want the government to decide which conditions can be effectively treated and which can't, in place of ourselves and our doctors. Similarly, the Department says that the benefit package excludes coverage for "conditions which get better on their own" and "conditions for which home treatment works." But, again, surely we don't want the government to decide what conditions this applies to, rather than ourselves.
The Oregon Health Plan includes another powerful rationing mechanism in addition to the medical services priority list. Health services covered under the Oregon Plan are to be provided primarily by HMOs or similar managed care arrangements, regardless of whether the covered individuals want to be in an HMO or not.
HMOs can work well in an open market where patients have other options, keeping HMO rationing in check. But under the Oregon Health Plan, the patients cannot choose among other options. They can only choose among a limited number of HMOs. These HMOs will consequently have much greater market power to ration and deny care. This power will be enhanced because the HMOs will be backed by the government as they carry out government cost control policy. These HMOs, and not individuals and families, will limit care in accordance with the government's artificially imposed resource limits.
The Oregon Health Plan has initiated still another rationing offensive with the Health Resources Commission. As indicated above, this Commission is charged with developing a process for "allocating" medical technologies in Oregon. This will again involve the government in deciding who will have access to these medical technologies and when. This process can only result in denying access to the latest, most advanced, most sophisticated technologies and treatments. In addition, incentives to develop new medical tools or treatments will be significantly reduced under the "cost control" mantra.
The employer mandate is a false promise. The cost of that mandate will ultimately be born by workers, not employers. Employers can pay no more in total employment costs than the productive output of the worker, or else go bankrupt. The employer mandate increases the cost of labor both absolutely and relative to other inputs, hastening substitution that causes job losses. If the employer is forced to pay more for a health insurance mandate, the employer will reduce the wages he would otherwise pay by the costs of the mandate, to return total employment costs to the level of worker productivity. Workers ultimately bear the costs of the mandate in lost wages or lost jobs.
Numerous econometric studies have estimated the likely loss of wages nationwide that would result from the similar employer mandate in the Clinton health plan. These studies generally estimate that workers across the country would lose about $100 billion a year in wages because of the Clinton mandate.(8) Oregon could expect a proportionate loss of wages from the employer mandate in the Oregon Health Plan.
Where employers may not be able to reduce wages to offset the mandate costs, they will simply lay off workers. With total employment costs above productivity, employers would suffer a loss by continuing to employ workers. This is most likely to occur at the lower income levels, where the minimum wage, payroll tax and other requirements may prevent a sufficient reduction in wages. The job losses resulting from the employer mandate would consequently be concentrated mostly at the lower income levels.
Econometric studies have also estimated the job losses that would result from the similar Clinton employer mandate. These studies estimate that 1 - 2 million jobs would be lost nationwide.(9) Indeed, one study estimated the job losses state-by-state, and indicates that Oregon would lose 11,900 jobs under the Clinton mandate.(10) Similar job losses would necessarily result under the employer mandate in the Oregon Health Plan.
The employer mandate is effectively just a hidden tax on workers, inefficiently causing a significant loss of jobs besides. The individual share of the mandate is just a direct tax on workers. These taxes would force workers to pay for the benefits that the government decides they must have, rather than the benefits workers themselves may choose. The Oregon Health Plan benefits package includes many benefits that workers may not need or want. Among these are unlimited abortions, drug and alcohol rehabilitation, broad, open-ended mental health services and counseling, and many routine services that are cheaper to pay for directly rather than through insurance. While workers could buy coverage for additional benefits, they could not replace benefits in the mandated benefit package they don't want with other benefits they do want.
The mandated benefit package means not only a loss of freedom of choice, but it also means higher costs as workers are forced to pay for benefits they may not want. For example, mandated drug and alcohol rehabilitation benefits in other states have been found to raise premium costs by 6 - 8 percent.(11) Mandated benefits for outpatient mental health services have been found to raise costs by another 10 - 13 percent.(12)
Ironically, for all this trouble, the mandates will not effectively achieve universal coverage. As a practical matter, the government will just not be able to track down and force everyone into health coverage. Even Hawaii, where employer and individual mandates have been in force for 20 years, has only 93 percent coverage.(13) Moreover, in the 41 states where auto insurance is mandated as a condition of driving, almost 15 percent of drivers remain uninsured.(14)
Indeed, mandates are entirely unnecessary in achieving universal coverage. The reforms discussed below will effectively achieve universal coverage without mandates, succeeding where mandates can't.
While one of the initial goals of the Oregon Health Plan is cost control, costs have only soared since the health plan was adopted. In the 1991 - 1993 biennium, before the Oregon Plan was adopted, Medicaid cost the state $306.1 million. Without the Oregon plan reforms, the state's share of Medicaid spending was projected to increase to $388.5 million for the 1993 - 1995 biennium. But with the Oregon plan reforms, budgeted state Medicaid spending soared to a projected $516.7 million during the 1993 - 1995 biennium, an increase of two-thirds in just one budget cycle. But the increases are not over. For the 1995 - 1997 biennium, state Medicaid costs are projected to increase to $708 million, another sharp increase of about 40 percent.(15)
Total Medicaid spending for the state, including the Federal share, is increasing at the same pace. In the 1991 - 1993 biennium, total Medicaid spending for Oregon was $808.8 million, with an expected increase to about $1 billion for the 1993 -1995 biennium. But with the Oregon Health Plan reforms, expected Medicaid spending jumped to $1.34 million for the 1993 - 1995 biennium, or an increase of about two-thirds over the 1991 - 1993 cycle. In the 1995 - 1997 biennium, total Medicaid spending in the state is projected to increase to $1.9 billion, again a jump of about 40 percent.(16)
Moreover, during the first 6 months under the Oregon Health Plan, enrollment soared past projections. As of August 1, 1994, 84,253 new beneficiaries had signed up under the expanded Medicaid program, about 40 percent (24,083) more than projected.(17) This raises questions over whether future spending increases will exceed the already soaring projections.
Worst of all, the powerful cost increasing incentives under the Oregon Health Plan are only starting to take effect. The root cause of rapidly rising health care costs in the U.S. is universally recognized as the third-party payment problem. Because someone else is generally paying the bills in health care -- either an insurance company or the government through Medicaid or Medicare -- consumers lack normal market incentives to keep costs down. They do not seek to avoid unnecessary care or to question the cost of their care, or to reject care when the costs exceed the benefits. Even more importantly, since consumers lack concern over costs, doctors and hospitals do not compete to reduce costs. Rather, since consumers primarily choose doctors and hospitals on the basis of quality and not cost, doctors and hospitals primarily compete to increase quality. This is unlike other natural markets where there is full competition over both cost and quality. The result is runaway costs.
Perversely, the Oregon Health Plan greatly expands rather than counters these cost increasing incentives:
Through the expanded Medicaid program, and the planned employer and individual mandates, third-party coverage and the third party problems would be extended to the currently uninsured.
The mandates would require workers to buy a benefit package that includes coverage for benefits and services many workers do not buy now, as indicated by the discussion above. The perverse third-party payment incentives would consequently be further extended in regard to these additional mandated benefits.
The mandated benefit package would inevitably have low deductibles and co-payments, as in the current Oregon Health Plan benefit package. This would maximize the third-party payment problem and its cost-increasing incentives for virtually everyone.
The only counter to these cost increasing incentives is to force those covered by Medicaid under the Oregon Health Plan into HMOs which have great power and incentive to ration their health care. The cost increasing factors in the health plan reforms would consequently be offset only to the extent of such rationing, which is the wrong way to control costs. Moreover, the Oregon Health Plan does not yet force workers not on Medicaid into such HMOs.
The Oregon Health Plan includes another important factor that would cause many if not most families to pay more. As indicated above, the mandates would force workers to pay for expensive benefits they may not need or want, adding to the cost of their coverage. Indeed, expensive benefits for drug and alcohol rehabilitation and mental health services are to be added to coverage next year for those under Medicaid in the new Oregon Health Plan system. These benefits would increase per capita costs in that system by 21 percent.(18)
All of the above problems of the Oregon Health Plan can be eliminated, and the goals of universal coverage and cost control far more effectively achieved, through the package of reforms described below. These reforms do not completely reject the current Oregon Health Plan, but instead retain the desirable elements, while removing the undesirable elements. We call this package of reforms the "power to the people plan" because it is based on maximizing freedom of choice and control for each individual patient and consumer.
Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs) are designed precisely to correct the problem of third-party payment incentives at the root of rapidly rising health costs. Instead of paying all their health care dollars to an insurance company, employers and workers would pay only a small portion of those funds for a catastrophic policy with a high deductible, perhaps $3,000 per year. The remainder would be contributed to an MSA for each worker. These MSA contributions, and returns on MSA investments, should be exempt from state income tax as employer contributions for traditional third-party insurance currently are. Workers could then directly pay health expenses below the deductible with MSA funds. Such withdrawals for health expenses should again be exempt from state income tax as are health insurance benefits.
Workers could withdraw any remaining funds at the end of the year as a reward for keeping medical costs down. These withdrawals would be subject to normal tax treatment just like other income. Alternatively, the worker could keep the funds in the MSA for future expenses or withdrawals.
With workers paying for non-catastrophic expenses out of their own MSA funds, they would have normal market incentives to control costs. They would avoid unnecessary care, and providers with excessive charges. They would be more likely to only consume health services where the benefits exceeded the costs. Probably more importantly, with this new consumer cost concern, doctors and hospitals would ethically compete to reduce costs as well as maintain quality instead of competing through the political process as another special interest group. Costs would consequently be controlled through incentives and competition, consistent with consumer preferences. In the process, workers would gain control over the bulk of funds that now go to insurance companies. Workers would be able to use such funds to their own best benefit, and would gain directly to the extent they were successful in controlling costs. Medical Savings Accounts are rapidly being adopted across the country with great success, even without the equal tax treatment under current law, as described above. A prime example is Golden Rule Insurance Company in Indianapolis. The company offers 2000 employees a traditional insurance policy with a $500 deductible and a 20 percent co-payment up to a maximum of $1,000 out of pocket. Or workers can choose an MSA. In that case, the employer deposits $2,000 into the account and provides the employee with complete catastrophic coverage above a deductible of $3,000. Maximum out-of-pocket expense is again $1,000.
In 1993, 80 percent of Golden Rule employees chose the MSA. At year-end, they withdrew an average of $602 per employee in remaining funds in their accounts. Moreover, health costs for the company were reduced by 40 percent. In 1994, 90 percent of the employees have chosen MSAs.
Other companies have tried similar approaches and also have had impressive results:
Dominion Resources, a utility holding company, deposits $1,620 a year into a bank account for the 80 percent of employees who choose a $3,000 deductible rather than a lower deductible. As a result, the company has experienced no premium increases since 1989, while other employers have faced annual increases averaging 13 percent.
Forbes magazine pays each employee $2 for every $1 of medical claims they do not incur up to a maximum of $1,000. As a result, Forbes' health costs fell 17 percent in 1992 and 12 percent in 1993.
Beginning in 1982, Quaker Oats implemented a high-deductible policy and paid an annual $300 into the personal health accounts of employees, who get to keep any remaining balance. Although the IRS recently forced the company to abandon this plan, it was highly successful; over the past decade the company's health costs grew an average 6.3 percent per year, while premiums for the rest of the nation grew at double digit rates.
The United Mine Workers recently adopted a similar approach for their union members. Last year their health plan had first-dollar coverage for most medical services. This year they negotiated a plan with a $1,000 bonus at the beginning of the year coupled with $1000 deductible insurance coverage. Employees get to keep whatever they don't spend.
Finally, Jersey City in New Jersey recently proposed MSAs for its city workers.(19)
State law should allow MSAs for all workers and independent individuals and families as described above. Individuals with freedom of choice vouchers, as described below, should be allowed to use them for MSAs as well. This is the most effective means for controlling health costs, and the only viable way of doing so consistent with individual freedom of choice and control over health care.
Instead of developing the medical services priority list and forcing the poor into HMOs to receive the government's chosen services, the Oregon Health Services Commission would provide vouchers to all of those eligible for Medicaid assistance under the current Oregon Health Plan. The vouchers would be equal in amount to the capitation fees the Commission would pay to HMOs for coverage for beneficiaries under the current Medicaid assistance plan. The poor would then be free to purchase the coverage of their choice from any source. They could choose an HMO or other managed care arrangement. They could choose traditional fee-for-service coverage. Or they could choose a Medical Savings Account, as described above. This would give the poor maximum freedom of choice over coverage, benefits, insurers, services, providers, and all other health care factors. But it would cost no more than the current plan because the vouchers only equal the capitation fee that would otherwise be paid to HMOs under the current system. Indeed, with the MSAs, costs may be substantially reduced, as described below.
In future years, the Legislature, in coordination with the Commission, would determine the voucher amount based on the available resources and the amount necessary to buy essential coverage. Such vouchers would allow more budgetary flexibility to adjust the subsidy to available resources than the cumbersome medical services priority list.
As discussed above, the effort to prioritize all health services on a single list is an intellectually misbegotten central planning enterprise. As a practical matter, the government cannot develop the information to perform the effort effectively. Moreover, doing so would only involve the government in ethically objectionable health care rationing that restricts the freedom of people to control their own health and. In addition, as a practical matter, this whole effort has failed to reduce costs significantly.
The medical services priority list and all efforts to develop it should consequently be scrapped entirely.
Instead of employer or individual mandates, universal coverage would be achieved under the power to the people plan through the following moderate changes in the current Oregon Health Plan.
Guaranteed Renewability. The Oregon Health Plan provides for guaranteed renewability of insurance sold to small businesses. This should be extended to all health insurance. Under this provision, insurers would be prohibited from canceling coverage for someone after they become sick, or in raising their rates more than for others. Instead, insurers would be required to renew coverage for all who desire at the same standard rate increases for everyone with the same policy.
Health insurance that can be canceled or subject to discriminatorily higher premiums after someone becomes sick is not insurance at all. It does not cover high health care costs, which is the protection people seek from health insurance. Just as insurers cannot be expected to issue fire insurance after a house catches fire, they cannot be allowed to cancel such insurance after a covered home catches fire. Guaranteed renewability, therefore, prohibits essentially fraudulent health insurance contracts.
Portability. Simple, non-burdensome regulation would provide that individuals covered by any employer group insurance policy would have the right to convert their coverage to an individual health policy when they leave their employment, as long as they or their new employers continue to pay the premiums. This would ensure that individuals could take their guaranteed renewable insurance with them from job-to-job. This provision has been developed and endorsed by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a nationwide organization of over 4,300 state legislators. With this provision and guaranteed renewability, everyone who has insurance coverage would be assured of keeping it.
Health Insurance Vouchers. The freedom of choice vouchers Already described above would enable the poor to buy the guaranteed renewable coverage as well. This would ensure that no one would lack essential coverage because they didn't have sufficient funds.
State Uninsurable Risk Pool. The Oregon Health Plan already includes a risk pool created by the Legislature in 1989. Those who have been denied health insurance are subject to exclusion of pre-existing conditions, become uninsurable because they have gotten sick, or who have to pay charges well above standard premiums, can obtain coverage from the Oregon Medical Insurance Pool.
The premiums for the coverage are set at 150 percent of standard rates because of the high risk medical conditions of the applicants. Even this would not be sufficient to pay health costs for the uninsurable. Consequently, the pool is currently subsidized by a tax on all health insurance premiums in the state sufficient to cover remaining medical costs for those in the pool. This year, about 3,600 Oregonians are covered by this pool.
Such pools are already in existence in 28 states and work well to target assistance for the seriously ill in need.(20) The health insurance vouchers should be coordinated with the pool to provide sufficient funds so that no one in need would be excluded. If health insurance is considered socially beneficial, the current tax on insurance premiums is counterproductive. These pools should therefore be funded from general state revenue, rather than the current, paradoxical premium tax.
These provisions would achieve all the social policy goals of universal coverage, without mandates, new bureaucracies, government rationing, reduced quality of care, lost freedom of choice, and a general government takeover of the health care system. Those who had insurance would be able to keep it. Those without sufficient funds would be given the means to buy it. And those who didn't buy it and became too sick to buy it later would be able to obtain coverage through the risk pool. Consequently, everyone would be able to obtain essential health insurance. Moreover, the financing for essential health care for all would be assured.
As discussed above, the employer mandate is a false promise as its costs are born by workers in lost wages, inefficiently causing a loss of jobs in the process. Moreover, the mandates are a tax on workers that forces them to pay for the benefits that the government and the special interests choose for them, rather than the benefits they choose, adding costs to pay for unnecessary expensive benefits they may not need or want. Moreover, the mandates would not even be effective in achieving universal coverage, and are not needed to do so. With the universal coverage provisions described above, the employer and individual mandates should consequently be repealed.
As described above, the benefit package for Medicaid under the Oregon Health Plan is currently slated to expand next year to include coverage for drug and alcohol abuse rehabilitation and open-ended mental health services. This would add substantial and unnecessary new costs to already out-of-control spending under the program, increasing per capita costs under the government's own estimate by 21 percent. As described above, such coverage could be purchased directly or with vouchers, if desired, by consumers.
As described above, the Oregon Health Plan has created a Health Resources Commission that has begun the process of rationing health care technology in the state, which can only reduce access to the best, most advanced, most sophisticated medical services and treatments for the middle class and the elderly. This ethically objectionable rationing initiative oppressively restricts freedom of choice and control by individuals over their own health and care. Better and more effective means of controlling costs have been advanced above. Consequently, the Health Resources Commission should be abolished; all efforts to ration health care technology should be abandoned.
The government should commit to carrying out these reforms without any new taxes. This would be feasible given the changes mentioned above. Since new taxes would further shift costs from some Oregonians to others, if new spending under the Oregon Health Plan is a priority, then it should be financed by reductions in other state spending.
The health policy question before the state is this: Who should control your health, its care, and your spending - you or the government? The Oregon Health Plan moves that control towards the government. The alternative power to the people plan shifts that power and control to you, each individual patient and consumer. The choice is yours.
About the Author
Peter J. Ferrara is (as of 1994) a senior fellow at the National Center for Policy Analysis. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School and Harvard College. (As of 1997 he is general counsel and chief economist at Americans for Tax Reform.)
Endnotes
1. "Oregon Health Plan will cost $1.9 billion during 1995-97" Oregon Health Forum, Vol. 4, No. 5, May 1994, p. 1; also Vol. 4, No. 9, September 1994, p. 3.
2. Joshua Wiener, "Oregon's Plan for Health Care Rationing," The Brookings Review, Winter, 1992, p. 36.
3. David Stipp, "Prevention May Be Costlier Than a Cure," Wall Street Journal, July 6, 1994, p. B1.
4. See discussion of the impact of the ADA in Oregon Health Services Commission, Prioritization of Health Services, Report for the Governor and Legislature, 1993, pp. 7-18.
5. "State Crunches Oregon Health Plan Numbers," Oregon Health Forum, Vol. 3, No. 4, April, 1993, p. 2.
6. Tom Mason: "Touted Oregon Health Plan Holds Fatal Flaws," The Oregonian, Nov. 25, 1992.
7. Office of Medical Assistance Programs, Department of Human Resources, The Oregon Health Plan, p. 16.
8. See discussion in Peter J. Ferrara, "The Health Policy Debate: Options for Reform," National Center for Policy Analysis, Backgrounder No. 131, July 7, 1994, pp. 2-3. 9. See discussion in Ibid, pp. 3-5.
10. Richard Vedder, PhD and Lowell Gallaway, PhD, "Concealed Costs: The Real Impact of the Administration's Health Care Plan on the Economy - A State-by-State Analysis", American Legislative Exchange Council, 1994.
11. John Gabel and Gail Jensen, "The Price of State-Mandated Benefits," Inquiry, Vol. 26, No. 4, Winter, 1989.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid, Vedder/Galloway, "Concealed Costs: The Real Impact of the Administrations Health Care Plan."
14. Insurance Information Institute, "Compulsory Auto Insurance," Insurance Issues Update, January, 1993.
15. "Oregon Health Plan will cost $1.9 billion during 1995-97," Oregon Health Forum," Vol. 4, No. 5, May, 1994, p. 1; also Vol. 4, No. 9, September 1994, p. 3.
16. Ibid.
17. "The Oregon Health Plan," Oregon Health Forum, August, 1994, p. 6.
18. Cooper and Lybrand, Oregon Health Plan Medicaid Demonstration, Analysis of Federal Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 Average Costs, April 19, 1993.
19. For further discussion of Medical Savings Accounts, see the following books and articles by John C. Goodman and Gerald L. Musgrave: Patient Power: Solving America's Health Care Crisis; "Medical Savings Accounts: An Idea Whose Time Has Come," National Center for Policy Analysis, No. 128, July 22, 1992; "The Economic Case for Medical Savings Accounts," paper presented at the American Enterprise Institute, April 18, 1994; "Medical Savings Accounts: The Private Sector Already Has Them," NCPA Brief Analysis No. 105, April 20, 1994.
20. Ferrara, "The Health Policy Debate," pp. 33-35.
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